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The first law enacted in Canada to protect existing
Aboriginal rights was section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982.2 The first law in Canada to recognize the rights of
non-human animals as anything other than property
has yet to be enacted. The first Supreme Court of
Canada (hereafter referred to as the Court) case to
interpret section 35 was R. v. Sparrow.3 The 1990 case
confirmed an Aboriginal right of the Musqueam peo-
ples of British Columbia to fish for food, social and cer-
emonial purposes. Since this precedent-setting case,
many similar claims have been brought before the
courts by way of the fluctuating legal space created by
s.35. Many of these cases have been about establishing
rights to fish4, hunt5, and trap non-human animals
(hereafter referred to as animals). The Court has devel-
oped, and continues to develop tests to determine the
existence and scope of Aboriginal rights. These tests
primarily embody cultural, political and, to a surpris-
ingly lesser degree, legal forces. One of the principal
problems with these tests is that they privilege, through
the western philosophical lens, the interests of humans.
Animals are, at best, the resources over which owner-
ship is being contested.
The Euro-centric legal conceptualization of animals as
'resources' over which ownership can be exerted is
problematic for at least two reasons. First, the relega-
tion of animals solely to a utilitarian role is antithetical
to Indigenous-animal relationships and therefore
demonstrates one of the fundamental ways the
Canadian legal system is ill equipped to give adequate
consideration to Indigenous law. Second, failure to con-
sider animals' inherent value and agency in this context
reproduces the human-animal and culture-nature bina-
ries that are at the root of many of western Euro-centric
society's inequities. 
This paper argues that Aboriginal peoples' relationships
with animals are a necessary, integral and distinctive
part of their cultures6 and, therefore, these relation-
ships and the actors within them are entitled to the
aegis of s.35. Through the legal protection of these rela-
tionships, animals will gain significant protection as a
corollary benefit. If the Court were to protect the cultur-
al relationships between animals and Aboriginal
groups, a precondition would be acceptance of
Indigenous legal systems. Thus, this paper gives a brief
answer to the question, what are Indigenous legal sys-
tems and why are animals integral to them?
The Anishinabe (also known Ojibwe or Chippewa) are
Indigenous peoples who have historically lived in the
Great Lakes region. The Bruce Peninsula on Lake
Huron is home to the Cape Croker Indian Reserve,
where the Chippewas of Nawash First Nation live. The
people of this First Nation identify as Anishinabe. The
Anishinabek case of Nanabush v. Deer is a law among
these people and is used throughout the paper as an
example of Indigenous-animal relationships. Making
the significant assumption that s.35 has the capacity to
recognize Indigenous law, the subsequent section of the
paper asks why we should protect these relationships
and how that protection should be achieved. Finally,
the paper concludes that both the ability of s.35 to rec-
ognize Indigenous-animal relationships, and the judi-
cial and political will to grant such recognition, are
unlikely. Indigenous-animal relationships are integral
to the distinctive culture of the Anishinabek, however
the courts would be hesitant to allow such an uncertain
and potentially far-reaching right. This is not surprising
given that such a claim by both Indigenous and animal
groups would challenge the foundations upon which
the Canadian legal system is based. 
There are many sensitive issues inherent in this topic. It
should be noted the author is not of Indigenous ances-
try, but is making every effort to learn about and respect
the Indigenous legal systems discussed.  While this
paper focuses on a number of Anishinabek laws; it is
neither a complete analysis of these practices, nor one
that can be transferred, without adaptation, to other
peoples. Finally, Indigenous peoples and animal rights
and Indigenous law scholars, such as Tom Regan and
Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, respectively, may insist on
an abolitionist approach to animal 'use' or reject the
legitimacy of s.35 itself.7 These perspectives are worthy
and necessary. This paper positions itself amongst
these and other sources in order to reflect upon the
timely and important issue of the legal status of
Indigenous-animal relationships.
I:WHAT ARE INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS?
The Law Commission of Canada defines a legal tradi-
tion as “a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned
attitudes about the nature of law, the role of law in the
society and the polity, the proper organization and
operation of a legal system, and the way law is or should
be made, applied, studied, perfected and taught.”8
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Indigenous legal traditions fit this description. They are
living systems of beliefs and practices, and have been
recognized as such by the courts.9
Indigenous practices developed into systems of law that
have guided communities in their governance, and in
their relationships amongst their own and other cul-
tures and with the Earth.10 These laws have developed
through stories, historical events that may be viewed as
‘cases,’ and other lived experiences.  Indigenous laws
are generally non-prescriptive, non-adversarial and
non-punitive and aim to promote respect and consen-
sus, as well as close connection with the land, the
Creator, and the community. Indigenous laws are a
means through which vital knowledge of social order
within the community is transmitted, revived and
retained. After European ‘settlement’ the influence of
Indigenous laws waned. This was due in part to the
state’s policies of assimilation, relocation and enfran-
chisement.11 Despite these assaults, Indigenous legal
systems have persevered; they continue to provide
guidance to many communities, and are being revived
and re-learned in others. For example, the Nisga’a’s
legal code, Ayuuk, guides their communities and
strongly informs legislation enacted under the Nisga’a
Final Agreement, the first modern treaty in British
Columbia.12
The land and jurisdiction claims of the Wet’suwet’en
and Gitxsan Nations ultimately resulted in the Court’s
decision in Delgamuukw,13 a landmark case that estab-
lished the existence of Aboriginal title. The (over-
turned) BC Supreme Court’s statement in
Delgamuukw14 reveals two of the many challenges in
demonstrating the validity of Indigenous laws: “what
the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en witnesses[es] describe as
law is really a most uncertain and highly flexible set of
customs which are frequently not followed by the
Indians [sic] themselves.” The first challenge is that
many laws are not in full practice, and therefore not as
visible as they could be and once were. What the courts
fail to acknowledge, however, is that the ongoing colo-
nial project has served to stifle, extinguish and alter
these laws. The second challenge is that the kind of law
held and practiced by Indigenous peoples is quite for-
eign to most non-Indigenous people. Many Indigenous
laws have animals as central figures. In Anishinabek
traditional law, often the animals are the lawmakers15:
they develop the legal principles and have agency as law
givers. For instance, the Anishinabek case Nanabush v.
Deer, Wolf , as outlined by Burrows, is imbued with
legal principles, lessons on conduct and community
governance, as well as ‘offenses’ and penalties. It is not
a case that was adjudicated by an appointed judge in a
courtroom, but rather one that has developed over time
as a result of peoples’ relationships with the Earth and
its inhabitants. An abbreviated summary of the case
hints at these legal lessons:
Nanabush plays a trick on a deer and deliber-
ately puts the deer in a vulnerable position. In
that moment of vulnerability, Nanabush kills the
deer and then roasts its body for dinner. While
he is sleeping and waiting for the deer to be
cooked, the Wolf people come by and take the
deer. Nanabush wakes up hungry, and out of
desperation transforms into a snake and eats
the brains out of the deer head. Once full, he is
stuck inside the head and transforms back into
his original shape, but with the deer head still
stuck on. He is then chased and nearly killed by
hunters who mistake him for a real deer.
This case is set within the legal context of the
Anishinabek’s treaty with deer. In signing the treaty,
the people were reminded to respect beings in life and
death and that gifts come when beings respect each
other in interrelationships.16 Nanabush violated the
rights of the deer and his peoples’ treaty with the deer.
He violated the laws by taking things through trickery,
and by causing harm to those he owed respect. Because
his actions were not in accordance with Anishinabek
legal principles, he was punished: Nanabush lost the
thing he was so desperately searching for, and he ended
up nearly being killed.
This case establishes two lessons. The first is that, like
statutory and common law, with which Canadians are
familiar, Indigenous law does not exist in isolation.
Principles are devised based on multiple teachings, pre-
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vious rules and the application of these rules to facts.
That there are myriad sources of Indigenous law sug-
gests that the learning of Indigenous law would require
substantial effort on the part of Canadian law-makers.17
The second is that animals hold an important place in
Indigenous law, and those relationships with animals –
and the whole ‘natural’ world – strongly inform the way
they relate to the Earth. 
II: CAN CANADIAN LAW ACCEPT INDIGENOUS
LEGAL SYSTEMS?
If there were a right recognized under s.35 concerning
the Indigenous-animal relationship, what would it look
like? Courts develop legal tests to which the facts of
each case are applied, theoretically creating a degree of
predictability as to how a matter will be judged.
Introduced in Sparrow, and more fully developed in
Van der Peet, a ‘test’ for how to assess a valid Aboriginal
right has been set out by the Court. Summarized, the
test is: “in order to be an Aboriginal right an activity
must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition
integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal
group claiming the right.”18 There are ten, differently
weighted factors that a court will consider in making
this assessment.
The right being ‘tested’ in this discussion is the one
exemplified in Nanabush v. Deer: the ability of
Indigenous peoples to recognize and practice their laws,
which govern relationships, including death, with deer
and other animals. The courts have agreed that a gener-
ous, large and liberal construction should be given to
Indigenous rights in order to give full effect to the con-
stitutional recognition of the distinctiveness of
Aboriginal culture. Still, it is the courts that hold the
power to define rights as they conceive them best align-
ing with Canadian society19;  this is one way that the
Canadian state reproduces its systems of power over
Indigenous peoples.20
The application of the Aboriginal right exemplified in
Nanbush v. Deer to the Sparrow and Van der Peet tests
would likely conclude that the Anishinabek do have an
integral and distinctive relationship with animals.
However, due to the significant discretion of the Court
on a number of very subjective and politically sensitive
factors, it is uncertain that the Nanabush v. Deer case
would ‘pass’ Van der Peet’s required ten factors.21 This is
indicative of the structural restraints that s.35 impos-
es.22 The questions it asks impair its ability to capture
and respect the interrelationships inherent in
Indigenous peoples’ interactions with animals. For
example, the Court will characterize hunting or fishing
as solely subsistence, perhaps with a cultural element.
Shin Imai contends these activities mean much more:
“To many…subsistence is a means of reaffirming
Aboriginal identity by passing on traditional knowledge
to future generations. Subsistence in this sense moves
beyond mere economics, encompassing the cultural,
social and spiritual aspects for the communities.”23
Scholar Kent McNeil concludes that: “regardless of the
strengths of legal arguments in favour of Indigenous
peoples, there are limits to how far the courts […] are
willing to go to correct the injustices caused by colonial-
ism and dispossession.”24 It is often not the legal prin-
ciples that determine outcomes, but rather the extent to
which Indigenous rights can be reconciled with the his-
tory of settlement without disturbing the current eco-
nomic and political structure of the dominant culture.  
III:WHY PROTECT THE ANIMAL-INDIGENOUS
RELATIONSHIP? 
Legally protecting animal-Indigenous relationships
offers symbiotic, mutually respectful benefits for ani-
mals and for the scope of Aboriginal rights that can be
practiced. For instance, a protected relationship would
have indirect benefits for animals’ habitat and right to
life: it would necessitate protecting the means neces-
sary, such as governance of the land, for realization of
the right. This could include greater conservation meas-
ures, more contiguous habitat, enforcement of endan-
gered species laws, and, ideally, a greater awareness
and appreciation by humans of animals and their
needs. 
Critical studies scholars have developed the argument
that minority groups should not be subject to culturally
biased laws of the mainstream polity.24 Law professor
Maneesha Deckha points out that animals, despite the
central role they play in a lot of ‘cultural defences,’ have
been excluded from our ethical consideration.
Certainly, the role of animals has been absent in judicial
consideration of Aboriginal rights.26 Including animals,
Deckha argues, allows for a complete analysis of these
cultural issues and avoids many of the anthropocentric
attitudes inherent in Euro-centric legal traditions. In
Jack and Charlie27 two Coast Salish men were charged
with hunting deer out of season. They argued that they
needed to kill a deer in order to have raw meat for an
Aboriginal religious ceremony. The Court found that
killing the deer was not part of the ceremony and that
there was insufficient evidence to establish that raw
meat was required. This is a case where a more nuanced
consideration of the laws and relationships with ani-
mals would have resulted in a more just application of
the (Canadian) law and prevented the reproduction of
imperialist attitudes. 
A criticism that could be lodged against practicing these
relationships is that they conflict with the liberty and
life interests of animals.28 Theoretically, if Indigenous
laws are given the legal and political room to fully oper-
ate, a balance between the liberty of animals and the
cultural and legal rights of Indigenous peoples can be
struck.29 Indeed, Indigenous peoples’ cultural and legal
concern for Earth is at its most rudimentary a concern
for the land, which is at the heart of the challenge to the
Canadian colonial system. If a negotiated treaty was
reached, or anti-cruelty and conservation laws were
assured in the Indigenous peoples’ self government sys-
tem, then Canadian anti-cruelty30 and conservation
laws,31 the effectiveness of which are already question-
able, could be displaced in recognition of Indigenous
governance.32
Indigenous peoples in Canada were – and are, subject
to imposed limitations – close to the environment in
ways that can seem foreign to non-Indigenous people.33
For example, some origin stories and oral histories
explain how boundaries between humans and animals
are at times absent: 
Animal-human beings like raven, coyote and
rabbit created them [humans] and other beings.
People …acted with respect toward many ani-
mals in expectation of reciprocity; or expressed
kinship or alliance with them in narratives,
songs, poems, parables, performances, rituals,
and material objects. 34
Furthering or reviving these relationships can advance
the understanding of both Indigenous legal systems
and animal rights theory. Some animal rights theorists
struggle with how to explain the cultural construction of
species difference: Indigenous relationships with ani-
mals are long standing, lived examples of a different
cultural conception of how to relate to animals and also
of an arguably healthy, minimally problematic way to
approach the debate concerning the species divide.35 
A key tenet of animal-Indigenous relationships is
respect. Shepard Krech posits that Indigenous peoples
are motivated to obtain the necessary resources and
goals in ‘proper’ ways: many believe that animals return
to the Earth to be killed, provided that hunters demon-
strate proper respect.36 This demonstrates a spiritual
connection, but there is also a concrete connection
between Indigenous peoples and animals. In providing
themselves with food and security, they ‘manage’ what
Canadian law calls ‘resources.’37 Because of the physical
nature of these activities, and their practical similarity
with modern ‘resource management,’ offering this as
‘proof’ of physical connection with animals and their
habitat may be more successful than ‘proving’ a spiritu-
al relationship. 
Finally, there are health reasons that make the
Indigenous-animal relationship is important. Many
cultures have come to depend on the nutrients they
derive from particular hunted or fished animals. For
example, nutrition and physical activity transitions
related to hunting cycles have had negative impacts on
individual and community health.38 This shows the
multidimensionality of hunting, the significance of
health, and, by extension, the need for animal
‘resources’ to be protected. 
IV: HOW SHOULD WE PROTECT THESE ABORIG-
INAL RIGHTS?
If the Anishinabek and the deer ‘win’ the constitutional
legal test (‘against’ the state) and establish a right to
protect their relationships with animals, what, other
than common law remedies,39 would follow? Below are
ideas for legal measures that could be taken from the
human or the animal perspective, or both, where bene-
fits accrue to both parties.
If animals had greater agency and legal status, their
needs as species and as individuals could have a mean-
ingful place in Canadian common and statutory law. In
Nanabush v. Deer, this would mean that the deer would
be given representation and that legal tests would need
to be developed to determine the animals’ rights and
interests. Currently the courts support the view that
animals can be treated under the law as any other inan-
imate item of property. Such a legal stance is inconsis-
tent with a rational, common-sense view of animals,40
and certainly with Anishinabek legal principles dis-
cussed herein.41 There are ongoing theoretical debates
that inform the practical questions of how animal
equality would be achieved: none of these in isolation
offers a complete solution, but combined they con-
tribute to the long term goal. 
Barsh and James Sákéj Youngblood Henderson advo-
cate an adoption of the reasoning in the Australian case
Mabo v. Queensland,42 where whole Aboriginal legal
systems were imported intact into the common law.
Some principles that Canada should be following can
also be drawn from international treaties that Canada
has or should have signed on to.43 Another way to seek
protection from the human perspective is through the
freedom of religion and conscience section of the
Charter.  Professor John Borrows constructs a full
argument for this, and cites its challenges, in Living
Law on a Living Earth: Aboriginal Religion, Law and
the Constitution.44 The strongest, but perhaps most
legally improbable, way to protect the animal-
Indigenous relationship is for Canada to recognize a
third, Indigenous order of government (in addition to
provincial and federal), where all three orders are equal
and inform one another’s laws. This way, Indigenous
laws would have the legal space to fully function and be
revived. Endowing Indigenous peoples with the right to
govern their relationships would require a great acqui-
escence of power by governments and a commitment to
the establishment and maintenance of healthy self-gov-
ernment in Indigenous communities. Louise Mandell
offers some reasons why Canada should treat
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Aboriginal people in new ways, at least one of which is
salient to the third order of government argument: 
To mend the [E]arth, which must be done, gov-
ernments must reassess the information which
the dominant culture has dismissed. Some of
that valuable information is located in the oral
histories of Aboriginal Peoples. This knowledge
will become incorporated into decisions affect-
ing the [E]arth’s landscape when Aboriginal
Peoples are equal partners in decisions affect-
ing their territories.45
V: CONCLUSION
A legal system that does not have to justify 
its existence or defend its worth is less vulner-
able to challenges.46
While it can be concluded that s.35 has offered some
legal space for Indigenous laws and practices, it is too
deeply couched in Euro-centric legal traditions and the
anthropocentric cultural assumptions that they carry.
The most effective strategy for advancing Indigenous
laws and culture, that would also endow many animals
with greater agency, and relax the culture-nature,
human-animal binaries, is the formal recognition of a
third order of government. Lisa Chartrand explains that
recognition of legal pluralism would be a mere affirma-
tion of legal systems that exist, but which are stifled:
“…this country is a multijuridical state, where the dis-
tinct laws and rules of three systems come together
within the geographic boundaries of one political terri-
tory.”47
Revitalizing Indigenous legal systems is and will be a
challenging undertaking. Indigenous communities
must reclaim, define and understand their own tradi-
tions: “The loss of culture and traditions caused by the
historic treatment of Aboriginal communities makes
this a formidable challenge for some communities.
Equally significant is the challenge for the Canadian
state to create political and legal space to accommodate
revitalized Indigenous legal traditions and Aboriginal
law-making.”48 The project of revitalizing Indigenous
legal traditions requires the commitment of resources
sufficient for the task, and transformative change to
procedural and substantive law. The operation of these
laws within, or in addition to, Canadian law would of
course cause widespread, but worthwhile controversy.
In Animal Bodies, Cultural Justice49 Deckha argues that
an ethical relationship with the animal Other must be
established in order realize cultural and animal rights.
This paper explores and demonstrates the value in find-
ing legal space where cultural pluralism and respect for
animals can give rise to the practice of Indigenous laws
and the revitalization of animal-Indigenous relation-
ships. As Borrows writes: “Anishinabek law provides
guidance about how to theorize, practice and order our
association with the [E]arth, and could do so in a way
that produces answers that are very different from
those found in other sources.”50
If animals had greater agency and legal status, their needs as species and as individuals could
have a meaningful place in Canadian common and statutory law. In Nanabush v. Deer, this would
mean that the deer would be given representation and that legal tests would need to be devel-
oped to determine the animals ํ rights and interests.
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